NATO Struggles to Maintain Control of Southern Afghanistan

On July 31, NATO forces assumed official command of Afghanistan’s six southern provinces from U.S.-led coalition forces. In the days since this change in leadership, approximately 15 NATO soldiers have been killed and 64 injured in the southern provinces (ISAF Press Office, August 21). In the weeks before NATO’s deployment to the south, insurgents increased their attacks against coalition and government troops. The U.S.-led Operation Mountain Thrust, during which more than 1,000 Taliban and al-Qaeda elements were killed, was called an operation to gain better ground in preparation for the handover of power to NATO; the operation, however, not only failed to ease the violence, but attacks have surged since then (Arman e Milli, August 5). Afghan Defense Minister Rahim Wardak said in an interview that the new wave of violence in the southern region is part of an insurgent plan to test NATO soldiers and examine the organization’s power (Tolo TV, August 01).

Since the takeover of command, NATO commanders have been concerned about civilian losses in their operations. As NATO’s top commander in Afghanistan, David Richards, said in a meeting with elders of some Afghan provinces, “due to the possibility of civilian losses, we canceled three operations in the south” (Azadi Radio, August 10). While it is important that NATO avoid civilian casualties, it is also critical that they maintain pressure on Taliban insurgents. One Afghan interpreter, working with U.S. special forces in troubled Helmand province, told The Jamestown Foundation on condition of anonymity that “NATO forces in Helmand are afraid of Taliban insurgents; during operations, their helicopters act passively and they do not have confidence in their Afghan counterparts.”

Domestically, NATO’s success depends on chiefs of local shura councils and maliks in the south, in addition to cooperation and coordination with the Afghan government. Many Taliban insurgents who are fighting against the Karzai-led government are indigenous Afghans, and the chiefs of local shura councils and local maliks have the ability to control these insurgents. These leaders support the Taliban because the Kabul government has attempted to destroy their poppy fields, from which opium is derived, and also because the government is unable to protect them from Taliban fighters, making any cooperation with the government dangerous.

In addition to this internal threat, part of the insurgency operates from the Pakistan side of the border. The extremist Pakistani parties like Jamaat-e-Islami have been key supporters of the Taliban (BBC Afghan Service, July 18). Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is facing a difficult problem in dealing with this reality. Although Musharraf does not want to support the insurgency in Afghanistan, in order to retain his domestic legitimacy he must be careful about disturbing Pakistani extremist leaders since they could cause his government to collapse. Nevertheless, NATO will need to apply pressure on Pakistan since winning the fight against local insurgents in Afghanistan will only achieve partial success; it will also need to find a way to end the support that the Taliban is receiving in Pakistan.

While NATO is operating cautiously, alliances with maliks and shura chiefs in southern Afghanistan is necessary to end the Taliban threat. Additionally, NATO forces will need to act more aggressively with their 4,000 troops in Helmand province, which is the center of the current Taliban insurgency. As the previously mentioned interpreter told The Jamestown Foundation, “The U.S. military, with just one group of special forces made of 21 people, managed to control half of Helmand province during the last four and a half years. Yet in the last two months, NATO-led forces have been unable to control Helmand with 4,000 troops.” In addition to these internal strategies, NATO will also need to devise a plan to settle the problem of the Afghan-Pak border.